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DELIMITATION OF THE PROBLEM
The Procedural Stage and Situation Type of Police
Questioning
The papers in this symposium will focus on that
phase of Criminal Law Administration which
chronologically precedes the suspect's first con-
tact with a judicial officer: the phase of police
action against or upon a suspect. This is the most
important phase of criminal procedure, for here,
much more so than during trial, the case is to be
won-or lost.
We shall assume that there has been contact
by a police officer with one suspected of having
committed a crime or at least with someone
believed to know something about a crime be-
lieved to have been committed. A police officer
may now enter the picture under any one of three
different circumstances. He may
(1) be armed with a warrant of arrest, or
(2) have the right to make an arrest without a
warrant, or
(3) he may not yet have reached the stage at
which he has the right and duty to effect an arrest
and thus may merely intend to elicit information
from the suspect or source of information so as
to lay the basis for a subsequent arrest and/or
preliminary hearing, or to satisfy himself that his
suspicion was unfounded and, thus, to clear the
suspect.
In situations (1) and (2) the problem of question-
ing is not very acute. The evidence which sufficed
for issuance of the warrant or for an arrest without
a warrant, e.g., testimony of witnesses, real
evidence, etc., will be available at a preliminary
judicial hearing, just as it was available when the
* For relevant views on this topic published after
oral delivery of this paper, see Symposium, Police
Questioning, [1960] Crne. L. REv. 298-356, with papers
by Ian Brownlie, Glanville Williams, T. C. Smith
and Christopher Williams. See also Stevens, Confes-
sions and Criminal Procedure-A Proposal, 34 WASH.
L. REv. 542 (1959); Note, 36 N.D.L. REv. 133 (1960).
duty to effect the arrest arose. Further evidence,
produced by lawful routine police work, is likely
to be added after arrest and certainly before the
case reaches the grand jury stage and, in the
ordinary course of events, the case is "sewed up
tight" when it goes to trial-granting, of course,
that troublesome cases do arise to disturb the
cozy sequence of our "ordinary course of events,"
especially when the evidence on which the arrest
was made proves to be worthless or wrong. But the
significant point is this: by demanding a relatively
high degree of provable suspicion for arrest, the
gap in the evidence requirements for arrest on the
one hand,' and for magisterial commitment on the
other,2 is not so large as to necessitate an elaborate
intermediate investigation or even insistence on
confessions.3
The difficult cases are those under (3), where no
legally sufficient evidence is available to warrant
the arrest of one or several suspects, but where a
crime certainly has been committed. It is under
these .circumstances that the police, not only
driven by their own sense of urgent duty but also
whipped into action by public opinion (the press),
E.g., "reasonable ground to believe that an offense
was committed and that the person against whom
the complaint was made committed it." A.L.I.,
CODE oF CRnnNAL PRocEDuRE §2, comment at 180
(1931), listing the state by state variations. For arrest
without a warrant see id., §21, comment at 231.
2"If it appears that any offense has been committed
and that there is probable cause to believe the
defendant guilty thereof,..." ALI, CODE Or Cami-
iNAL PROCEDuRE §55, comment at 311 (1931); com-
pare id., §40.
3 E.g., in comparison with the low degree of sus-
picion sufficient for arrest under the 17th and 18th
century European penal codes, which, to bridge the
gap, relied strongly on the extraction of confessions
after arrest. Reliance on the method of torture was
believed necessary in view of the investigator's diffi-
culties which lack of facilities for swift long-range com-
munication posed, a difficulty with which the modern
investigator is no longer faced. In general see ScmnT,
EnF6HRuNG IN DIE Gascmc=r DER DEUTSCEEN
STARFREcH SPP'LEGE §§7-76 (1951).
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are most frequently tempted to resort to means
and methods through which they expect a swift
solution of the case, although the law may not
approve of these means and methods. We shall
have to concentrate, therefore, on this third situa-
tion type without, however, neglecting the other
two.
In further delimiting and defining the subject
_ of our inquiry it is worth pointing out that Ameri-
can law grants every citizen, even the worst ex-
convict, a rather extensive right to speak or to
keep silent when he pleases, subject, of course,
to the limitation of practical wisdom that a
person found under very incriminating circum-
stances who fails to give a reasonable explanation
can blame only himself if an officer of the law
takes permissible steps to determine the lawfulness
or unlawfulness of his activity.4 By the same token,
the police have a virtually unlimited right to ask
questions. They are not entitled to any answers,
and whether or not they will receive any answers
depends very much on their skill, their reputation
and the time and circumstances of the question-
ing. In my own police experience I have learned
that it is much easier to get answers from a
suspect whom one engages in a friendly interview
(chat) at his home, before sufficient evidence for
an arrest has been accumulated, than from an
arrestee at the station house. Somehow the suspect
clams up at the station house and the chance for
easy response is lost once and for all. True, the
suspect's answers given at his home prior to
arrest are quite likely false. So much the better!
False answers are the wedge which will ultimately
split the block. Involvement in contradictions,
false alibis, etc., will render the ultimate conviction
of the suspect without his furtber personal par-
ticipation relatively easy. (At the same time, the
innocent suspect is much more at ease in his own
home and is saved the embarrassment of an
appearance at the station house.) I therefore view
with distrust and disfavor any argument to
advance the arrest stage so as to acquire earlier
custody of a suspect for the purpose of question-
ing him at the station house. It is my considered
opinion that such would not tend toward greater
4 The extent to which the statutes granting arrest
rights for failure to give a good account of oneself
are merely codifications of this common sense notion
or exceed the bounds of legality, is of no interest in this
connection. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. §2:2002-16
(1937); 2 O'REGAN & SCHLOSSER, CRnnNAL LAws
OF Nxw JERSEY §1814 (1942), see also id., §1799, and
cases cited there.
efficiency in detection. There is, of course, no
scientifically acceptable, empirical evidence avail-
able to substantiate the point, although compara-
tive studies between American jurisdictions are
possible since some American states know some-
thing like an arrest on mere suspicion, 5 while the
American majority view is otherwise, at least
theoretically.
The Types of Questioning: Interview-Interrogation-
Inquisition
Having determined the procedural stage and
situation type at which police questioning
occurs, we must now identify the types of ques-
tioning which are employed. The type of ques-
tioning which operates without restraint of the
suspect is frequently called interviewing. Even
judges violently opposed to sharp questioning
methods are willing to grant the police the right
to interview sources of information, or, indeed,
suspects, prior to arrest. 6 The interview, highly
important for. -successful criminal investigation,
should be distinguished from two other forms of
questioning with which we are much more con-
cerned. The Army Field Manual on Criminal
Investigation, for example, makes the distinction
between
"interviews, which are conducted to learn facts
from persons who may have knowledge of a
wrongful act but who are not themselves
implicated; and interrogations, which are con-
ducted to learn facts and to obtain admissions
or confessions of wrongful acts from persons
who are implicated in a wrongful act. Persons
For earlier efforts to legalize arrest on suspicion
for the purpose of questioning, especially under the
Uniform Arrest Act, see Warner, The Uniform Arrest
Act, 28 VA. L. Rzv. 315, 320-21 (1942), patterned
after some state statutes, especially Massachusetts,
GEN. LAws c. 41, §98 (1932). For an account of police
practice in the thirties, see WAiTE, CRIMNAL LAW IN
AcrioN cC. VII-IX (1934). For more recent accounts
see MORELAND, MODERN CRIMU'TAL PROCEDURE C.
4 (1959). The practice is still with us and perhaps
even increasing! For statutory sanction in Missouri
see State v. Cantrell, 310 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1958). On
arrest for refusal to identify and account for oneself
under suspicious circumstances, see note 4, supra.
An aura of doubt surrounds the car-stop cases in
which the officer "arrests" the progress of the occu-
pants, for the purpose of questioning, but not (yet)
for the purpose of an arrest. For more detailed discus-
sion see Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration-
1960 Annual Survey of American Law, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 111, 130 (1961).
a E.g., Bazelon, J., dissenting in Heideman v. United
States, 259 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 959 (1959).
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who have been interviewed may later be in-
terrogated."
7
The third type of questioning is sometimes called
"inquisition," 8 and it differs from interrogation
mainly in intensity and a higher degree of con-
comitant restraint.
We may proceed henceforth under the assump-
tion .that police officers do conduct interviews
and interrogations, and perhaps even inquisitions,
with the aim of gathering information leading to
the solution of unsolved crime, that they do hope
to obtain admissions and confessions, that they
like confessions very much, regarding them as
virtually tantamount to a conviction.
THE MARK OF UNLAWFULNESS OF QUESTIONMNG
Although, as we shall see, determination of the
unlawfulness of a given type of questioning by
direct criteria is neither impossible nor unknown,
the determination is commonly made in terms of
the procedural-evidentiary consequences. It is
the answer to the question whether a confession
will be sanctioned as evidence in court which
ultimately permits us to draw a conclusion about
the lawfulness of the type of questioning from
which the confession resulted.
Some confessions, and thus some types of
questioning, are regarded as quite proper and
approvable by the courts, while others are re-
garded as obnoxious, improper, objectionable and
unlawful. We must, therefore, seek to ascertain
the mark of unlawfulness of a confession in terms
of its evidentiary fate.
Exclusion of Confessions
The only really significant mark of unlawfulness
of a confession under federal law is its exclusion
from evidence.9 The rule in the states is no dif-
ferent on principle, although only in a minority
of states is there full identity of unlawfulness of
the mode of obtaining the confession and its
exclusion from evidence, while in a majority
unlawfulness of the questioning does not neces-
sarily lead to exclusion from evidence. The point
is too well known to require any annotation. In
this majority of the states, therefore, not even
exclusion from evidence can serve us as a safe
7 DEPARTMENT oF THE ARmy, CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TION 36 (Field Manual 19-20, 1951).
8Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); see also
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 152 n.6 (1943).
9Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
applicable to all illegally obtained evidence.
criterion. In those states our test of unlawfulness
is, in essence, a symptomatic one derived from
those factual criteria which make for unlawfulness
and exclusion in the exclusionary jurisdictions.
There may be other or additional consequences
of procuring a confession in an unlawful manner,
and it might be contended that those other con-
sequences could serve us as a mark, e.g., cause of
action for damages against the police officer, the
department, the municipality or state,10 causes
of action on the delinquent officer's bond,"
disciplinary proceedings, or even criminal punish-
ment of those who procure what ad hoc is de-
termined to have been an unlawful questioning.
But all these consequences are collateral and
quite dearly of secondary significance. In fact,
they are unreal, since rarely employed and rarely
successful.
Whether exclusion from evidence is the proper
and preferable method for achieving what society
wants to achieve remains to be discussed after we
dcide what it really is that we want to achieve.
The Purpose of Exclusion of Confessions
Ultimately all rules of criminal procedure and
evidence serve. two goals: conviction of those
guilty under law and acquittal of those innocent
under law. For this purpose we need, first of all,
trustworthy and reliable evidence. We cannot do
better than to convict or to acquit on the basis
of reliable evidence. This and no more was postu-
lated by all the older confession cases. But another
line of car soon began to test the lawfulness of a
confession-and thus of the questioning which
produced it-in terms of the degree of volun-
tariness with which it had been made. But the
voluntariness cases pursued no other goal than
the trustworthiness cases, as Inbau rightly pointed
out,N2 the theory simply being that compulsion
renders what would otherwise be a trustworthy
confession completely unreliable. But many judges
made it quite dear that they also meant to apply
that old stimulus-response theory on which all
law rests: the exclusionary rule was to serve as
stimulus on law enforcement officers to cause them
to abstain from undesirable practices in the
,0 E.g., see Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir.
1958); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d
130 (Fla. 1958), not a confession case; Houghtaling v.
State, 175 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
1 In general, see Branton, Financial Responsibility
of Police Officers, 19 LAW. GUILD REv. 52 (1959).
2 INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TION 150 (2d ed. 1948).
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eliciting of confessions.1 3 This reasoning supposed
that the police and prosecutors would like to
maintain a relatively unblemished record of
convictions and so would refrain from objectionable
practices which might lead a court to tarnish this
record by a directed acquittal or reversal of con-
viction. Thus, the second purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule was 'a disciplinary one, and few
have doubted that it is proper for courts to thus
discipline the subalterns of an arm of the court,
the prosecution.
14
There is much speculation on whether or not
the stimulus-response hypothesis is borne out by
practical experience. Empirical research has not
been done, so that we must simply continue to
guess. Professor Inbau, our country's leading.
expert in the matter, believes that practice does
not support the supposition. 5 From my personal
practical experience as a police officer, working
under the English Judges' Rules, I am inclined
to think otherwise, namely that members of a
professional police force will do what is necessary
to obtain a conviction record to which they can
point with pride, and they will abstain from prac-
tices which might jeopardize such a record, whether
they agree with the courts' reasoning or not.
The General Legal Framework of Unlawfulness
(a) Constitutional and Evidentiary Limitations
In the good old days, state and federal courts
employed largely their own limitations in de-
termining the unlawfulness of a confession. A
fair body of common law precedents as to what
constituted voluntariness and trustworthiness 6
formed the background for later decisions under
state constitutional due process provisions and
under the federal Fifth Amendment due process
provision,17 as well as under the general supervisory
13 McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TEx. L. REV. 447 (1938); Allen, The
Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Crimi-
nal Justice, 8(1) U. of Chi. L.S. Rec. 3, 11 (1958),
citing cases.
14 Inbau argued that "the fundamental concept of a
three-fold division of power seems to indicate that
there is no authority for any court to exercise dis-
ciplinary control over the police." Inbau, Law and
Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation
and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 77 (1957).
15 Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United
States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 460 (1948).
16 For the then prevailing line of authority, see Wilson
v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1895); Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574 (1884). The earliest American case in point
I have been able to locate is State v. Hobbs, 2 Vt. 380
(1803).
IT In general, see Allen, op. cit. supra note 13, and
the works by Inbau, cited herein.
power of the United States Supreme Court over
the federal judiciary.18
But by 1936 local police forces all over the
United States had so irritated and antagonized
the public and the Supreme Court with Gestapo
and K.P.U. methods," that the Court felt com-
pelled to begin its supervision of state practice
under the authority of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, with both mentioned goals in mind.20
Regardless of the admissibility of a confession in a
state court, federal due process would now in-
validate a conviction based on a confession ob-
tained through questioning in violation of the
federal standard. For a while, therefore, the
practice as to the unlawfulness of confessions and
questionings was identical for both federal (Fifth
Amendment) and state (Fourteenth Amendment)
courts, at least as far as the strictly constitutional
minimum limit is concerned. And with this proviso,
such is still the state of the law today.
(b) The Federal Rules: Delay
But federal practice was to change less than a
decade after the usefulness of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an anti-coerced-state-confession
weapon had been discovered by the Supreme
Court. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
just being under consideration, the Court found
a new weapon against non-conforming federal
officers and prosecutors in a statute which was
just standing model for the creation of Federal
Rule 5(a), requiring production of an arrestee
before a U. S. Commissioner forthwith (in case of
arrest with warrant) or without unnecessary delay
(in case of arrest without a warrant). Inbau traced
the origin of this rule and found that it had been
created to prevent federal marshals from cheating
18 In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341
(1942), Justice Frankfurter supports the point by
authority. But apart from Rule 5, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and Fifth Amendment cases, the
Court has not really made any evidence rules on con-
fessions. Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 14 (1924),
cited by Justice Frankfurter in McNabb, as supporting
the Court's power to create rules of evidence, had not
actually made any such rule. While in laying down the
standard it did not refer to the Fifth Amendment, it
relied on cases decided under the Fifth Amendment,
at 14, n. 5.19Especially as revealed by the Wickersham Com-
mission Report, IV REPORTS Or NATiONAL Comas-
sioN oN LAw OBSERvANCE Am ENFORCEmENT (1931).
2 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); fol-
lowed by Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944),
originating the "inherently coercive" doctrine; Malin-
sky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1947); and see Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953), as to the scope of supervision and
review.
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the government on mileage fees in delivering
prisoners 2l This original purpose, of course, did
not prevent the Court from seizing upon the rule
to make it serve any other purpose which the
language of the statute permits.
Although the Court had previously talked about
holding federal officers to decent standards of
law enforcement, it was not until McNabb v.
United States that the Court for the first time
talked freely of its supervisory functions,D civilized
police practices, and the dangers inherent in
delaying the production of an arrestee before a
judicial officer (incommunicado detention), all
adding up to the rule that, trustworthy or not, a
confession is tainted when procured by uncivilized
practices, and unnecessary delay, in violation of
Federal Rule 5, may well furnish the proof of
uncivilized practices.n
Since that decision the Court has adhered to
its rule,2 slowly overcoming the reluctance of
federal trial courts to direct an occasional acquittal.
Upshaw and Mallory are the milestones on the
road from McNabb.2 5 Under these cases the test of
unlawfulness is not one measurable by the length
of detention, in minutes and hours, preceding the
production of an arrestee before the commisioner
or judge but, essentially, it is a test of reason-
ableness of effort to produce the arrestee promptly,
leaving unaffected civilized standard inquiries
under the Fifth Amendment.
2 6
All this leaves federal officers somewhat in doubt
in the execution of their sworn duties. Theoretically
they must forthwith, or without unnecessary de-
lay,-note the difference in terminology, depending
21 Inbau, op. ciL supra note 15.
22 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943), a
case of collaboration with state officers.
2 This is not a constitutional but only a rule-inter-
preting decision. Note that in McNabb there was both
delay and subtle psychological pressure.
2 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), is
sometimes cited as inconsonant with the mainstream
of cases. Strictly speaking this is incorrect. Mitchell
was a confession-delay case, the others are delay-con-
fession cases, so that the inducement factor is the dis-
tinguishing criterion. The only surprising aspect of
Mitchell is Justice Frankfurter's statement that the
Supreme Court's power to shape rules of evidence
"is not to be used as an indirect mode of disciplining
misconduct," id. at 17, which appears inconsistent
with the rationale of McNabb, Upshaw, supra note
18, and Mallory, infra note 25.25 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
26 Note that, of course, prompt arraignment provi-
sions are to be found in the constitutions or statutes
of most states as well. For citations see McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44, n.7 (1942).
on the nature of the arrest-take each arrestee
before a judicial officer. Obviously, if no judge is
available, they cannot do so but must, I suppose,
stand ready to prove effort, good faith and un-
availability of a judgeY2 The police may, of course,
properly discharge their administrative duties
connected with arrest, and such is not violative
of the anti-delay rule.2 Perhaps, since the rule
governing delay after arrest without a warrant is
phrased in terms of necessity, the officer may even
question the arrestee
"immediately after an arrest, provided the in-
terrogation is not Prolonged .... The rule of
the Mallory case is that a seven and one-half
hour delay is too long. Where the line is to be
drawn must be determined according to the
usual process of the common law by judicial
decisions as cases arise. A graph must be grad-
ually plotted by a series of rulings on specific
states of facts...."2
At least, such is the opinion of an informed District
Court Judge who helped draft Rule 5. While I
cannot agree with the judge that the ultimate test
is one which measures necessity of the delay, or
unlawfulness of the delay, with a stop watch,-
there is no indication that the Supreme Court is
willing to sanction such a test-I certainly concur
with the learned judge that officers may indeed
question the arrestee under the law as it stands
now. Any rule forbidding a police officer from
talking to his suspect might be applicable on the
Moon, but evert there it would have to be changed
after arrival of the first rocket load of earthlings.
27 E.g., Porter v. United States, 258 F.2d 685 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).2
9In a recent case this took less than one hour.
Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.
1958). Compare an older state decision in which a one
hour delay was held to be unlawful, Harness v. State,
159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875 (1902).
How many hours does discharge of the administra-
tive routine duties actually consume? In New York
City, for example, "it may mean eight or ten more
hours beyond the regular working schedule to take
the prisoner through the involved procedures of book-
ing, identification and arraignment in court." Phillips,
New York's Finest-Again under Fire, N.Y. Times
Mag., March 1, 1959, p. 14, at 31. Note that Putt-
kammer speaks of possible overnight detention prior to
booking. (Does this imply idle detention or a night of
questioning?) PUTTKAMIR, MANUAL ON CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE §127 (Chicago Crime Com-
mission, 1946). "'Every time I make an arrest,' said a
New York Officer, 'I know it is more than just another
notch for my record-it's a cold supper and an un-
happy wife.'" Phillips, supra, at 34.
2
9 Holtzoff, J.,in Heideman v. United States, 21 F.R.D.
335, 339 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 259 F.2d 943 (D.C.
Cir.) cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959 (1959).
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Judge Bazelon, the vigorbus and libertarian
District dissenter, opposes the District Court in-
terpretation of Mallorym but even he would grant
the police the right to question a suspect prior to
arrest, as noted. But this itself is a dangerous rule
unless we make certain that the privilege extends
to interviews only, not to interrogations or in-
quisitions,-all to be further defined. But once
arrested, it is Judge Bazelon's belief that the sus-
pect ought to be immediately arraigned before a
magistrate, so that he may be advised of his rights.
Speaking about the majority's position contra,
Judge Bazelon thundered:
"They say such a procedure is actually for the
benefit of the arrested person because it gives
him a chance to avoid being formally charged
before a magistrate. I think it is the height of
irony that the arrested person's greatest pro-
tection-his right to be brought before a magis-
trate under Rule 5-should be treated as an
evil to be avoided." 31
This exemplifies the presently raging contro-
versy over the Supreme Court's anti-delay ruling.
Which way the Court will now turn is anybody's
guess: Is all federal police questioning ultimately
to be outlawed? Is it outlawed only if it post-
pones production before a magistrate?u If so, the
federal police will have to time their arrests to one
minute after the courts close their doors. A con-
fession obtained prior to the reopening of the
court's doors would be as lawful as the long ques-
tioning which produces it. To avoid such a subter-
fuge, the Court can hold only that a properly
guarded and fairly conducted non-coercive ques-
tioning, with all cautions and rights. extended,
lasting only a very brief spell of time,n and a con-
fession so produced, will be lawful, i.e., the
30 Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943, 947-
50 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959 (1959).31Id. at 949-50. Other recent cases are discussed in
Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1958 Annual
Survey of American Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 83, 104-
05 .(1959); Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure,
1959 Annual Survey of American Law, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REv. (1960).
2 See Justice Reed's opinion in Porter v. Uiited
States, supra note 27.
13 In Mallory, the Court said that Rule 5 (a) con-
templates "a procedure that allows arresting officers
little more leeway than the interval between arrest
and the ordinary administrative steps required to bring
a suspect before the nearest available magistrate." 354
U.S. at 453. The crucial words are "little more leeway."
Read against the Mitchell case, phrased in terms of one
willing to make a confession, here may lie the real
answer to the troublesome question.
-confession will be admissible.3a Realities of police
work seem to call for at least that much leeway, if
for no other reason than to guide magistrates in
properly conducting the preliminary hearing and
to save a suspect, properly arrested without a
warrant, whose innocence can be ascertained by a
few questions, the embarrassment of a magisterial
hearing. It is unrealistic not to admit that a magis-
terial hearing may severely and adversely affect
a citizen's reputation. The further a suspect is
shoved up on the ladder of criminal proceedings
prior to ultimate determination of the issue, the
greater is the adverse effect on his reputation.nb
Although some scholars fear that the Court is
headed in the direction of extending its unreason-
able delay-civilized standards test to govern state
proceedings, a the Court certainly has not said
expressis verbis that it even considered such a possi-
bility.34a As late as 1951 the Court declared a state
detention of twenty-five days prior to arraign-
ment-the confession having been rendered on the
fifth day-not to be violative of Fourteenth
Amendment due process. 3 This is certainly more
than a liberal measure,36 and all indications are to
the effect that the proven Fourteenth Amendment
due process test will continue to be applied to the
states, most of which are in basic agreement with
"a After completion of the manuscript so held in
Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.
1960), where Burger, J., strongly indicated that con-
fessions made during a one and a half hour questioning
with a one hour typing of the confession, with necessary
interruptions, were not inadmissible, id. at 342-45,
and held, moreover, that judicial permission may be
granted for police to continue the interrogation while
the suspect is in the marshal's custody after judicial
hearing, and such later confession would stand. Id. at
340-42.
_3b Ibid., per Burger, J.
N Collings, Criminal Law and Administration, in
1957 AmNuAL SURVEY Op AzxmcAN LAw 92, 109.
31a What is likely to happen, however, is that the
Supreme Court will doubly extend the Elkins doctrine
(Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); and see
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), generated
by Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir.
1958)), to Fifth Amendment confession cases and to
federal supervisory (extra-constitutional) standards.
Elkins v. United States, decided under the Court's
federal supervisory power-but with strong references
to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-took the
predicted step of overruling the (search and seizure)"silver platter" doctrine by holding that "evidence
obtained by state officers during a search which, if
conducted by federal officers, would have violated the
defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
over the .defendant's timely objection in a federal
criminal trial." Id. at 223.
31 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
36 For Indiana's exclusion of a confession after a one
hour delay, see Harness v. State, supra note 28.
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the Supreme Court anyway, although professing
to reject Mallory, et al.
THE FoRs S OF QUESTIONING
Disregarding the problem of unnecessary de-
tention for questioning, we are now squarely
faced with the forms which lawful or unlawful
questioning may take. What type of questioning
is actually being practiced by the police, and where
is the limit of the permissible, i.e., where does
unlawfulness begin, expressed through rejections
of confessions in the elusive terminology of due
process? Some day, perhaps, a line might be
drawn between lawful and unlawful questioning of
an arrestee in terms of inquisition and interroga-
tion. So far these terms are little more than
epithets applied to a particular questioning pro-
cedure after it has been outlawed for whatever
reasons.
Since police officers do not tell us when they
violate the law or even when they are operating
close to the line, we must search for evidence
dehors the police blotter, the era of police boast-
ing about third degree method having long passedY
We can judge only by what is taught to police
officers in their training manuals, by what is
revealed through the press, and by what occas-
sionally gets into the courts.
The police manuals and textbooks consulted
for this purpose would unquestionably find
judicial endorsement. They speak of the reasonable
opportunity which the law affords for questioning
suspects. They warn against oppressive practices,
generally not going overly into detail, but do not
warn against employment of the typical investiga-
tors' tricks in questioning.n
At least occasionally, actual practice seems to
vary from the standards taught at police academies.
In the City of Chicago, in 1957, the sheriff's
police in the Grimes Sisters murder case were
reported to have held a suspect incommunicado
for five days and to have grilled him severely,
producing a confession which did not jibe with
the physical facts. 9 Later similar scandals have
7 MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 95.
38 E.g., HouTs, FROM ARREST TO RELEASE 75-77
(1958); PUTTKAM3MR, op. cit. supra note 28, §127. In
general, see also MACHEN, THE LAW OF ARREST §45
1950). DAX & TIBns, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
52, 98-101 (1946); SmTir, LAW oF ARREST, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE 14 (1956).
19 HoURs, op. cit. supra note 38, at 77. In private
conversation, I was informed by a sheriff's deputy that
Houts is in error. The five day holding was done by
the Chicago City Police.
occurred in Chicago and elsewhere so that the
older disreputable police practices described by
all the authors of the thirties may still be found,
although, fortunately, on a much reduced scale.
It is this grilling in which we are here interested.
I think that we may find four basic methods of
grilling a suspect,-but I would not wish to at-
tempt a differentiation in terms of interrogation
and inquisition.
(1) Questioning with Accompanying Brutality
We shall start with the grilling in its most
vicious form, the brutal coercion of a confession.
There is no question whatsoever that any form
of physical abuse to extract a confession (third
degree0), or, indeed, any information, is and always
has been highly unlawful in this country!' Charges
of brutality on the part of the police are still
frequently voiced and occasionally substantiated. 2
No statistics and no field research can establish
how prevalent the practice is, but I suppose that
the unashamed answers of a New York police
lieutenant in the middle of the Twentieth Century
are indicative of the situation in at least some
police departments today:
"Q. And it was perfectly all right with you
to have these prisoners beaten and knocked
around, wasn't it?
A. Perfectly all right for them to be knocked
down, yes, sir.
40 The origin of the term "third degree" is uncertain.
Moreland takes it as derived from Russian interroga-
tion practice, under which cross examination consti-
tuted the first degree, confrontation the second and
severe physical duress the third. MORELAND, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at 91, citing Ripley's Believe It or Not.
Webster's NEW WorLD DIcTIoNARY or T AmERicAN
LANGUAGE 1516 (1953) indicates that the term might
well be derived from the masonic initiation into the
third degree, a traditionally rigorous exercise and test.
(Like practices seem to prevail with some other fra-
ternal organizations.) Another possible source is the
Peinliche Gerichtsordnung of Empress Maria Theresia of
Austria, of December 31, 1768 (Constitutio Criminalis
Theresiana), which knew three degrees of suspicion
and probable cause. The least degree of suspicion en-
titled the prosecution to "special investigation," the
next higher degree of suspicion to an arrest, and the
third degree of suspicion ("half proof") to application
of torture. All three degrees together constituted the
"inquisitorial procedure" which, of course, was con-
ducted in secrecy. See LOHSING-SERINI, OSTERREICHI-
scnxs STRAFPROZESSRECHT 15 (1952).
41 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
4 Among recent cases are: United States ex rel.
Alvarez v. Murphy, 246 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1957); see
also United States ex rd. Wade v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 908 (1958); United
States v. Cummings, 154 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn.
1956); People v. Speaks, 156 Cal. App. 2d 25, 319 P.2d
709 (1958), virtually unbelievable in this country.
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Q. And beaten? Is that right? It was in
accordance with your wishes?
A. Not wishes.
Q. But you were satisfied?
A. Yes, sir."' 3
I should merely like to suggest that the criminal
law with its sanctions against assault and battery
is available and should be rigorously applied to
violating officers. In fact, it might be worth
considering an increase in the punishments for
assault and battery committed during performance
of official duties. Other possible protections can
best be discussed below.
(2) Questioning under Psychological Coercion
The next type of questioning relies on torment,
the creation of mental stress, anxiety, tiring-out,
etc., so as to induce the subject to make a con-
fession. It is here where we are encountering
major legal difficulties, there being no dear-cut
guide by the Supreme Court, but only a score of
sometimes hard-to-reconcile cases." Having neither
the time nor the inclination to reiterate what has
been competently and repeatedly discussed in
dozens of law review articles, I shall restrict
myself to a summary: The official test of the Court
still seems to be that of the Ashcraft line of cases
which outlaws "inherent compulsion" in question-
ing, meaning sustained police pressure in the
nature of mental torture, especially through
relentless overbearing of the will-in short,
inquisitorial methods.45 But this objective test
gains meaning only through what appeared to be a
conflicting line of cases, starting with Stein v.
New York,46 which is regarded as having introduced
a subjective standard. Stated differently, in my
opinion Stein merely certified the rather obvious
fact that what may be "inherently compulsive"
as to one suspect, may not be "inherently com-
pulsive" as to another. In determining compul-
siveness subjectively, the Court looks at a number
43Quoted in United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson,
256 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 908
(1958).
"For a discussion of the trends, and especially the
frolic and detour of Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1952), see Cohn, Federal Constitutional Limitations on
te Use of Coerced Confessions in the State Courts, 50
J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 265 (1959). See also Meltzer,
Involuntary Confessions-The Allocation of Responsi-
bility Between Judge and Jury-A Comment on Stein v.
People of the State of New York, 21 U. Cm. L. Rav. 317
(1954).
45Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1949).
48 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1952).
of criteria, recently excellently summarized in a
student note:
"1) number of questioners;
2) health, age, education and race of the
defendant;
3) time held incommunicado;
4) delay before arraignment;
5) length of questioning, deprivation of re-
freshment, rest or relief during question-
ing;
6) threats or promises of benefit made;
7) hostility of questioners;
8) defendant's experience in ways of crime;
and
9) living conditions during detention."41
Two recent examples may serve to demonstrate
the test in action:
In People v. Speaks, the suspect was arrested
shortly after she had had an epileptic seizure.
She was kept up all night and questioned to
exhaustion, was not informed of her constitutional
rights, was not taken before a magistrate until
six days after her arrest, was denied a phone call
and an attorney, and was, during all this time,
confined in a dark, damp, dingy basement cell
together with drunks, and in a psychopathic
ward together with psychopaths, was continuously
interrogated for hours at a time, including at night
time, was refused food and comforts, and was
subjected to an electroencephalograph test for
which needles were injected into her scalp, to
a depth of 4 to Ys of an inch, producing
intense pain. She confessed. 49 This case comes
rather close to actual police brutality.
A case of more subtle mental torment arose in
the Yale city of New Haven in 1954. Defendant, a
negro with an eighth grade education, forty-eight
years old, was suspected of murder and held incom-
municado. The questioning police officer threatened
47 Note, 33 NEB. L. R y. 507, 508 (1954), a comment
on the Stein case, and reviewing all the appeals from
state courts, since 1939; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1951); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 681 (1948); Turner
v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1948); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1948); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1947);
Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944); Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596 (1943); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); and
numerous convictions reversed without opinion, a
total of 17 cases on which the Court was divided and
ten on which it was unanimous, between 1939 and 1954.
The author also tabulated the voting records of the
judges.
48 People v. Speaks, 156 Cal. App. 2d 25, 319 P.2d
709 (1958).
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the recalcitrant suspect (Rogers) with bringing in
"for questioning Roger's [arthritic] wife if Rogers
did not confess. He threatened to send the two
foster children of the Rogerses, who were state
wards, to an institution meanwhile," and "made
a pretended telephone call on a dead wire to hold
a car and officers in readiness to get Mrs. Rogers
and the children. He then gave Rogers an hour
to make up his mind whether to confess. At the
end of that time he took the phone to pretend to
order Mrs. Rogers and the children brought in.
At this point Rogers gave in and made a con-
fession."' 9 Needless to say, such a method is
highly unlawful and probably even constitutes
inherent compulsion' 9' regardless of the subjec-
tive factors of the defendant's personality. 5
(3) Questioning with Trickery and Deceit
The third method of questioning is marked by
the use of trickery and deceit not amounting to
compulsion, i.e., not creating fear, anxiety or
despair. The holdings are virtually unanimous
that trickery and deceit on the part of the ques-
tioner, as long as not amounting to torment, are
not unlawful.5' The Army Field Manual on Criminal
Investigation does not advocate outright deceit,
but it does endorse false emotional displays, false
sympathies, and the like.52 Similarly, Inbau, in
his work on the subject, accepts the employment
of false though realistic emotional displays during
questioning," and has practiced this method rather
successfully himself.54 He rationalizes that "at
times the interrogator must deal with the criminal
offender in a somewhat lower moral plane than
that in which ethical, law-abiding citizens are
49 United States ex rel. Rogers v. Cummings, Reincke
v. Tillinghorst, 154 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1956).
4ft The Supreme Court decided the case just in time_
for insertion in this article. The test is, indeed, whether
or not there was compulsion, i.e., overbearing of the
will, and not whether the confession was trustworthy:
Rogers v. Richmond, 81 S. Ct. 735 (1961) (with two
justices dissenting).
"0 But see Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707
(D.C. Cir. 1958), Bazelon, J., dissenting, where suspect
was suffering from narcotics withdrawal pains, ques-
tioning to gain confession, holding transfer to hospital
in abeyance until confession obtained, does not seem
to amount to an unlawful torment.
61 See Dession, Freedman, Donnelly, Redlich, Drug-
Induced Revelations and Criminal Investigation, 62
YAlm L.J. 315, 333, n.58 (1953), citing 3 WIGORE,
EvmENcE §841 (3d ed. 1949); INBAU, LIE DETECTION
AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 175 (2d ed. 1948).
'2DEPARTMENT Or TEE ARMY, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 51.
5INBAU, op. cit. supra note 12, at 105-149.
u Llewellen, How to Make a Killer Confess, Sat. Eve.
Post, March 31, 1956, pp. 33, 99-100, an article on
Professor Inbau.
expected to conduct their ordinary affairs."'5
The courts, nolens volens, appear to accept this
reasoning. But even the moralist must agree that
at least the soft-touch method is ethically un-
objectionable. Merely by way of example, when
a Scotland Yard Officer once had to interrogate
a group of American sailors of the "gangster" or
"bully" type, he employed the soft-touch method,
talked about their mothers and girl friends and
finally got them "in such a state of pathetic
sentimentality and homesickness that one man
broke down and wept,"-and confessed. 6
The variations between deceit, sympathy falsely
portrayed, false emotional display and the soft-
touch method in its even less objectionable forms
need not interest us any further since all these
methods, so far, are judicially regarded as lawful."
(4) The Employment of Scientific Means or De-
vices During Questioning
(a) The polygraph. There is, first of all, question-
ing with the aid of the polygraph, the so-called lie
detector. We are here not interested in the ques-
tion of admitting polygraph test results into
evidence. Our problem is that of questioning with
the aid of the polygraph to obtain confessions,
admissions or information. While the experts lay
great stress on the scientific perfection of the
device during recent years,"' courts are still re-
luctant to fully endorse questioning. with the aid
of the lie detector. (Are they, perhaps, merely
using the scientific imperfection argument to
avoid the issue of the ethical justification for
probing man's innermost spheres?") Test results,
,5 INBAu, op. cit. supra note 12, at 149. On a later
occasion Inbau realized that, after all, the suspect
may turn out to be just another law abiding citizen,
rather than a criminal offender. Inbau, The Confession
Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILr.
L. REv. 442, 447 (1948), where he added "criminal
suspects who may actually be innocent," but persisted
in the "low plane" approach. See also id. at 451; and
Inbau, Law and Police Practice: Restrictions in the
Law of Interrogation and Confession, 52 Nw. U.L. R1v.
77 (1957). This drew criticism from Judge Leibowitz
in Leibowitz, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in
the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 86 (1957).
'" MARTENSSEN, CR.IME AND = PoLIcE 74 (1951).
7"Sympathy falsely aroused," was condemned in
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), but only
when accompanied by official pressure, fatigue or other
factors.
5In general, see INBAU, op. cit. supra note 12;
Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the "Lie Detector", 40
IowA L. REV. 440 (1955).
9 In general, see Silving, Testing the Unconscious in
Criminal Cases, 69 HAuv. L. REv. 686 (1956). For
frank European standpoints see Kaganiec, Lie Detector
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standing like admissions, are at least admissible
in evidence when both parties had consented to
such examination. 6" But since the defendant's
protection is restricted to exclusion of the test
results from evidence, seemingly the police may
use the lie detector for questioning, i.e., as an
investigative tool, and if only to scare a given
suspect into making a confession before the test
with this fearsome machine is actually conducted."
Such would, by some holdings, not amount to an
unlawful interrogation practice.n2 In concluding
the subject of the polygraph interrogation, I
should like to point to the Statement of Principles
Regarding Polygraph ("Lie Detector") Examina-
lions, adopted by the American Academy of
Polygraph Examiners in 1957, which should dispel
many doubts as to the intentions and motives of
polygraph examiners, so that, at least in that
respect, we need not be overly fearful.
If we encounter objection to the employment of
the polygraph in questioning suspects, it usually
rests on two considerations: (1) the teleological,
or foot-in-the-door argument, i.e., that once the
practice receives outright sanctioning, the salesman
will have his foot in the door and ultimately,
through permissible comment at trial, we will
add "lie detector sex offenders" to "fifth Amend-
ment Communists."" The second consideration
is an emotional one. It is powerful, though it
rarely breaks loose from the subconscious strata:
the polygraph chair (and, for that matter, the
electroencephalograph chair) does not look unlike
the electric chair!
(b) Questioning with depth-psychiatrical methods.
The courts have been more explicit with respect
to interrogations conducted with the aid of
hypnosis, narcosis, or other forms of partial
removal of inhibitions, especially when induced
Tests and "Freedom of the Will" in Germany, 51 Nw.
U.L. RFv. 446, 47 3. ClRu. L., C. & P.S. 570 (1957).
See also 39 J. CGml. L. & C. 665 (1949), for the French
point of view.
60 People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d
937 (1948); see also George, Scientific Investigation and
the Defendant's Rights, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 37 (1959).
There is a paucity of holdings in point.
6" Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d
389 (1941); State v. De Hart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d
360 (1943); see also Bennet, The Arson Investigator
and Technikal Aids, 49 3. C=ne. L., C. & P.S. 172, 176
(1958), for the experiences of the Detroit arson in-
vestigators.
62I.e., no coercion: People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69
N.E.2d 366 (1946); Brunner v. People, 113 Colo. 194,
156 P.2d 111 (1945).
63 48 3. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 568 (1958).
64 Silving, op. cit. supra note 59, at 692, n.39.
by the administration of drugs.' 5 Confessions
elicited by such methods have been struck down
throughout," notwithstanding that an odd con-
viction may be upheld where a drug administered
to an addict in custody, to alleviate narcotic
addiction withdrawal pains, may also have rendered
the arrestee talkative enough for production of a
confession.67
SUMMARY or THE LAw-THE CRUCIAL
ISSUES-CONCLUSION
The Law
We may now summarize: Federal officers may
probably question a suspect in a civilized, non-
coercive manner for a brief spell of time. Federal
officers have a "little leeway," but, after an arrest
without a warrant, may not cause unnecessary
delay. This seems to imply a very limited right to
ask questions. After an arrest with a warrant,
the federal officer must produce the suspect
promptly (forthwith) before a judge. Questioning
in this case seems to be impermissible, nor, indeed,
is it necessary. State officers may hold and ques-
tion their suspects for a longer period-provided
most probably that the evidence is not to be
used in federal courts-, subject only to the
prompt hearing mandates of their own state
constitutions or statutes. Beyond that, federal
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments imposes limitations on the type and
manner of questioning suspects. Whenever 'there
is a right to interrogate, civilized standards must
be followed. And while there is an absolute limit
beyond which the questioner must never venture,
most cases will probably be judged subjectively
6In general, see Dession, Freedman, Donnelly,
Redlich, op. cit. supra note 51; Muehlberger, Interroga-
tion Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIu. L., C. & P.S.
513 (1951).
6 E.g., Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755
(Ky. 1960), and see George, op. cit. supra note 60, at 50,
n.70, citing Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954);
Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir." 1956);
State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952);
People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951);
State v. Puseh, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950).
But psychologists or psychiatrists employing scientific
tests may testify to the defendant's condition: People
v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 93 N.E.2d 925 (1942); but
cf. People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595
(152).
7 Sheedy, Narcointerrogation of a Criminal Suspect,
50 J. Cane. L., C. & P.S. 118 (1958), commenting on
People v. Townsend, 141 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. 1957),
noted at 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 666 (1957); 24 BROORaLN
L. REv. 96 (1957). See also Griffith v. Rhay, 177 F.
Supp. 386 (E.D. Wash. 1959).
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on the issue of coerciveness employed in question-
ing. Trickery and deceit alone will not invalidate a
confession ipso facto, but mental and physical
torment will.
Can law enforcement operate successfully within
these restrictions? My answer would be yes,
provided a number of caveats be observed.
1) The incompetent, unintelligent or untrained
police officer does not have a chance to work
successfully within these limits. As Inbau ad-
vocated strongly, police professionalisation is the
answer on this point.68
2) Police attitude on the timing of the arrest
must change materially. Many police officers
"prejudge a suspect's guilt and make their arrest
too soon." 69 Arrest, unless flagrante delicto, should
not be made until the police have independently
gathered enough information to warrant a binding-
over to the grand jury by the examining magistrate.
3) Interviewing of a possibly concerned person
has legal and psychological advantages over
interrogation of an arrestee. The police ought to
work more with interviews, less with interroga-
tions.
4) Interviewing is successful only when the
police enjoy the respect of the community. This
respect it can gain by avoiding oppressive prac-
tices.79 If one police officer is oppressive-and
goes unpunished-the entire department will
share the disrepute, and the community will be
68 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 15, at 460.
69 HouTs, op. cit. supra note 38, at 76.
70 Consider, for example, the simple device of in-
forming an arrestee of his rights, perhaps even of
posting them at the station house. This will create
respect and rarely, if ever, interferes with the success
of the investigation. Such is the new practice in New
Orleans, see United States v. Sigler, 162 F. Supp. 256
(E.D. La. 1958), from which case note 4 is worth
quoting:
A placard bearing the following information is now
prominently displayed in each police station in the
City of New Orleans:
"Right of Arrested Persons
"These Are Some of Your Rights Un-
der the Laws of the United States and
the State of Louisiana
"Right to Call Lawyer
"'All persons arrested shall, from the moment of
their arrest, be entitled to confer with counsel
** *' (L.S.A.-R.S. 15:77)
"Right to Use Telephone
"'They (arrested persons) shall be given the right
and privilege of using the telephone in the jail or
station or send a messenger for the purpose of com-
municating with counsel and with his friends and
relatives for the purpose of securing counsel. They
shall also have the right and privilege of using the
telephone in the jail or station or send a messenger
for the purpose of communication with any person,
very reluctant to cooperate in responding to
questions or otherwise.
5) The importance of confessions is overem-
phasized in America.71 Independent preliminary
leg and brain work, and especially scientific
detection, are often more significant in solving a
case than confessions.
The Crucial Issues: Exclusion or Not
A question we posed at the outset remains
unanswered. Above and beyond guaranteeing that
convictions will not stand on untrustworthy
evidence, is the exclusionary rule the best possible
stimulus for obtaining from the police the desired
response of civilized practices?
The Supreme Court has taken a thoroughly
moral and typically American position: Even if
trustworthy, it would be impaoral for the state to
utilize a confession obtained by what common
mores, as ascertained by the Court, regarded as
uncivilized. The government must not become
particeps criminis to the wrongdoing of individual
police officers. I do believe that most of our
professional police officers are moral enough to
firm or corporation in order to secure their release by
bail or parole.' (L.S.A.-R.S. 15:77)
"Right to Bail
"'In all *** cases (other than capital cases) the
person accused shall be entitled to bail. The amount
of the (bail) shall be fixed with consideration of the
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous
criminal record of the (person accused) and the
probability or improbability of his appearing at the
trial * * *.' (L.S.A.-R.S. 15:86)
"Right to Remain Silent
"'No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding
that may subject him to criminal prosecution * * *.
No person uhder arrest shall be subjected to any
treatment designed by effect on body or mind to
compel confession of crime; nor shall any confession
be used against any person accused of crime unless
freely and voluntarily made.' (Article I, Section II,
Louisiana [L.S.A.-] Constitution, 1921.")
The Massachusetts Attorney General has printed
and distributed to police departments a pamphlet
entitled "If you were arrested," for dissemination to
arrestees. This pamphlet describes the arrestee's
rights. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 1, 1960, p2,
cols. 6-8.
71 Kennedy, Some Practical Suggestions for the Taking
of Criminal Confessions, 48 J. Cnms. L., C. & P.S. 660
(1958); Schroeder, New Procedures of Scientific In-
vestigation and Protection of the Accused's Rights, 49 3.
CRam. L., C. & P.S. 265 (1958); Edwards, New Pro-
cedures of Scientific Investigation and the Protection of
the Accused's Rights, IV. B. I. Int. Acad. Comp. L. 5th
Congr., Brussels, p. 189 (1958). On the efficient and
intelligent investigation method of revenue agencies,
see Murphy, The Investigative Procedure for Criminal
Tax Evasion, 27 FORDnHAM L. REV. 48 (1958).
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go along with this reasoning or, at least, are
conviction-eager enough to respond to the stimulus.
If an individual officer is not responsive, he ought
to be dismissed on short order.
But what if it could be established that exclu-
sion has not yielded the expected results, that we
have deceived ourselves all along? How else
could civilized standards in conducting police
interrogations be secured?
The ordinary criminal, civil, and administrative
(disciplinary) remedies have been mentioned
already. They/are available now, and not even in
conjunctiov With the exclusionary rule do they
seem to constitute an effective remedy. (Or does
the exclusionary rule work so well that in those
jurisdictions there is no need to resort to the more
direct remedies against violating officers?)
Nor should we expect relief by threatening
imprisonment to police officers who violated
civilized standards. Although the police usually
are in favor of expanding the coverage of the
criminal law, I do not think they would like
such a new crime on the statute book. Moreover,
privacy being essential for successful 4uestioning,7
proof of uncivilized practices, especially mental
coercion, "beyond a reasonable doubt," would be
hard to render. To void a conviction, on the other
hand, the coercion need not be established beyond
a reasonable doubt, so that the exclusionary
rule seems preferable for practical reasons.
A third choice would lie in making police ques-
tioning a public matter, by permitting the public
(and thus the press and ultimately perhaps newsreel
and TV photographers) to be present.7 3 But the
price to be paid would be so high in terms of
detriment to the suspect and the community
(the investigating state authority) as to render
such a plan worthless in practice. Semi-publicity
might have greater promise, i.e., questioning
conducted only if an attorney, relative or other
confidant of the arrestee is present. Foreign
countries, e.g., Sweden and Germany, have
wider experience with the arrestee's right to call
in a friend or relative, and we should be eager to
learn about their experiences. Immediately, of
course, the question arises, how we should enforce
this right to the presence of a confidant. By an
exclusionary rule, or by what? Quis cuslodiet
custodes? It is the same old problem!
This, finally, brings us to the problem of the
7 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 15, at 447.
73 See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330, 340-43 (1957).
right of representation by counsel at this pre-
liminary stage of criminal procedure. It has been
suggested that the mandatory presence of an
attorney right after arrest will solve all our
problems. (No one, so far, has suggested that a
prospective arrestee should be warned to engage
an attorney so that the waiting officer may then
make an arrest.)
Mr. Allison has presented the arguments pro
candidly and skillfully in a. recent article. His
points are:
"L This is the only Way to Make Real the
Recognized Rights and Safeguards that We
Say an Accused Has Under Our Form of
Government;
H. This Guarantee Will Help Prevent Use of
Third Degree Methods and Extra-Legal In-
terrogations;
Im. Advice of Counsel Early After Arrest Will
Improve the Quality of Police Investigation;
IV. Counsel Early in the Proceedings Will Put
the Poor Defendant on the Same Footing as
Those Able to Pay;
V. Early Representation Will Enable the De-
fendant to Prepare His Defense, Thereby
Affording Equal Justice." 74
Law enforcement officers are opposed to such an
extension of existing rights to representation be-
cause they
"desire to question the accused or consolidate
their case by securing additional evidence
unhampered by the professional tactics of an
attorney. An attorney, if he were obtainable
would advise the prisoner to answer no ques-
tions, in most cases he would secure the pris-
oneg's immediate release on bail, in any event
he would slow down tremendously the tactics
which are occasionally employed during the
period between arrest and the preliminary
examination." 76
The reality of the right to the assistance of
retained counsel at the police inquest stage de-
pends largely on the resolution of the issues
already discussed. If police officers have no right
to question their suspects, but must immediately
surrender them to a magistrate, there is neither
need nor opportunity to hail counsel to the station
house. Procurement of counsel might cause delay
beyond the time necessary for booking the prisoner,
and a friendly police officer who would shelve the
74 Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 J. Am. Jum.
Soc'Y 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 (1958).
75 MoxmLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 173.
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proceedings until the arrival of counsel might
actually be violating federal due process.
But if and where a reasonable period for police
questioning is accorded, the presence of an
attorney in watch dog capacity will unquestionably
prevent use of coercive police methods, whether
or not there be need for any legal advice to the
client. Therefore, my demands for postponing
the arrest until the time when questioning of the
suspect is no longer of paramount importance has
even more validity if the right to presence of
counsel at the station house is universally recog-
nized.
What is the status of this right? The laws of
the states vary widely, ranging all the way from
a flat denial of either retained or appointed counsel
at this preliminary stage to criminal penalty
provisions against officers who fail to grant an
arrestee the right to consult with retained counsel.
7 6
Until but a few years ago it could be safely said
that
"the right of the defendant to obtain legal
advice is almost wholly controlled by the
discretion of the officers who have him in
custody, and that an abuse by them of the right
will bring no more than a judicial reprimand in
form of a declaration that the officers have
been overzealous in the performance of their
duties."7
But in 1958, the Supreme Court felt compelled
to assert its powers over state police practice,
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Seizing upon a dictum in Powell v.
Alabama that the defendant "requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding
against him,"78 the Court in Crooker v. California
added the dictum that
"state refusal of a request to engage a counsel
violates due process not only if the accused is
deprived of counsel at trial on the merits,
... but also if he is deprived of counsel for any
part of the pre-trial proceedings, provided that
he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his
7
1 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38 §449.1.
71 Note, Right to Counsel Prior to Trial, 44 Ky. L.J.
103, 107 (1955). The older law is nicely summarized
in MoRELAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 172-79.
78 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see
also Chandler v. Freytag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). The history
of the Court's use of the 14th Amendment to safeguard
the right to representation by counsel in general,
through the "traditional process of inclusion and ex-
clusion," starting with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), is retraced in Cash v. Culver, 79 S. Ct. 432,
435 (1959).
subsequent trial with an abuse of 'that funda-
mental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice.' "19
But the Court found that "the sum total of the
circumstances here during the time petitioner was
without counsel.., do not show petitioner to
have been so 'taken advantage of' ... as to
violate due process of law.""0 On a similar fact
situation, and reaching the same result, the Court
in Cicenia v. Lagay added that under its general
supervisory power over the federal judiciary the
result might well have been different."'
With these Fourteenth Amendment due process
cases we now have a subjective test for the de-
termination of unlawful refusal of the assistance
of counsel at the police inquest stage (with respect
to capital cases?). The test aims directly at the
civilized practices-anti-coercion standard familiar
to us from the cases dealing directly with question-
ing. Thus, in specific cases, subjectively judged,
abusive denial of legal assistance, for coercive
purposes, is one of the factors to be used-an
important one at that-to determine coerciveness
of police practices in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 If we now ask ourselves the ques-
tion how to enforce this right to counsel at the
police inquest stage, we have, as in the folk song
"Dear Lisa," reached the first stanza again. The
circle is complete. Exclusion of the confession
rendered in the absence of counsel or not?
But there remains one last possibility, not very
obvious to Americans. We could deprive the police
of all right to question their suspects and turn
our lower judiciary and commissioners into French-
style examining magistrates. At the magisterial
inquest stage the right to be represented by counsel
of choice, or, in many cases and jurisdictions, to
have counsel assigned, is already an existing
practice. The examining magistrate, however,
would have to become an inquisitor. But this
question we better defer until we hear from our
European colleagues about their experience with
the juge d'instruction or Untersuchungsrichter.
Conclusion
Our views on questioning and confessions are
still tainted by medieval traditions, when circum-
79 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958),
quoting, in part, from Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941).
"I Crooker v. California, supra note 79, at 440.
There were four dissents.
"1 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).
2 In general, see Allen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 10.
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stantial evidence or witness' testimony never
sufficed to convict a person. For the sake of his
soul, the medieval defendant had to confess,
whether he liked it or not, and capital execution
without a confession would have been regarded as
immoral everywhere, and as illegal in many
continental jurisdictions.m Well, standards of
morality have changed! We no longer hesitate to
8 Such was the philosophy of the Constitutio
Criminalis Carolinae, the penal code of Emperor Charles
V, whose jurisdiction extended over the Americas as
well. During the 19th Century this code of 1533 still
had subsidiary force in some remnants of the then
defunct Holy Roman Empire, and as late as 1824 (the
code's latest edition known to me) the torturing of
suspects was regarded as more feasible and moral than
either an acquittal, or a punishment without a con-
fession. Koca (ed.), HAIS--ODna PEINLIcE GERICHrs-
ORDNUNG KAISER CAUS V 6-12 (1824).
convict absent a confession, and rightly so. Hence,
there is no longer a need for abusive questioning,
or, indeed, in many cases for any questioning at
all. A professional police renders its proof in a
professional manner very much without the
defendant's personal participation and not by
what today is a morally and legally abusive
practice.81
84After condusion of this manuscript, the Supreme
Court handed down its unanimous decision in Black-
bum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), finding that the
extraction of a confession from a most likely insane
and incompetent escapee from an insane asylum, in a
session lasting more than seven hours, conducted in a
dingy room filled with police officers, amounted to"an unconstitutional inquisition." The unanimity of
the Court is noteworthy and lends encouraging support
- to the views expressed in this paper. See also note 49a,
supra.
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